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Foreword
David M. Shapiro, Emily McCormick & Annie Prossnitz †
These pages are the product of the first law review symposium in five
years on solitary confinement, a topic that inspires rich discussion in
courtrooms, universities, prisons, legislatures, and even the Vatican.1 The
Northwestern University Law Review’s 2019 Symposium, “Rethinking
Solitary Confinement,” brought together preeminent legal scholars and
national experts on solitary confinement to foster interdisciplinary
engagement on the subject.
In 2018, Justice Sotomayor likened solitary confinement to a “penal
tomb.”2 Many other jurists have recently joined the chorus, expressing grave
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concerns about long-term human isolation.3 Meanwhile, ever-mounting
evidence shows that solitary confinement can induce and exacerbate severe
mental illness, provoke self-mutilation and suicide, and cause the brain to
literally shrink in physical size.4
Solitary confinement is known by many names—supermax prisons,
disciplinary segregation, Special Housing Units (SHUs), Special
Management Units (SMUs), and Administrative Segregation Units (ASUs
or Ad-Seg), to list just a few. But regardless of the name used, solitary
confinement generally refers to the practice of keeping inmates alone in a
cell, in conditions designed to sharply curtail human interaction, for twentytwo to twenty-four hours a day.5 Isolation cells in Illinois’s Stateville
Correctional Center typify solitary confinement quarters: small chambers
with “gray walls, a solid steel door, no window, no clock, and a light that [i]s
kept on twenty-four hours a day.”6
In addition to the social isolation, sensory deprivation, and physical
harms inflicted by solitary confinement, extreme isolation also causes
significant mental and psychological injuries. They include: “negative
attitudes and affect, insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hypersensitivity,
ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control,
irritability, aggression, and rage, paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy,
depression, a sense of impending emotional breakdown, self-mutilation, and
suicidal ideation and behavior.”7 While solitary confinement cells house 2%
to 8% of the American prison population, they account for almost half of all
inmate suicides.8
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Speakers brought a wide range of expertise to the Symposium—legal,
correctional, personal, historical, medical, and psychological. In his keynote
address, Senator Dick Durbin, the sponsor of federal legislation that would
limit solitary confinement,9 reflected on two solitary survivors who testified
before Congress. Senator Durbin quoted Damon Thibodeaux, who spent
fifteen years in solitary confinement:
“More than anything solitary confinement is an existence without hope. I do not
condone what those who have killed and committed other serious offenses have
done. But I also don’t condone what we do to them when we put them in solitary
for years on end and treat them as sub-human. We’re better than that. As a
civilized society, we should be better than that.” Mr. Thibodaux was right
then—he’s still right.10

Following opening remarks by Dean Kimberly A. Yuracko, speakers
included: former prisoners who survived solitary confinement (Brian Nelson
and Albert Woodfox), legal scholars who study incarceration and the Eighth
Amendment (Sharon Dolovich, Jules Lobel, Judith Resnik, and John
Stinneford), medical and psychological experts (Craig Haney and Brie
Williams), the head of a state correctional system (Leann Bertsch), and
advocates working to limit, if not eliminate, prolonged solitary confinement
(Amy Fettig, Maggie Filler, Daniel Greenfield, Alan Mills, Laura Rovner,
and Margo Schlanger).
The contents of this issue reflect the interdisciplinary character of the
convening. The issue begins with three histories of solitary confinement: an
English and early American legal history of constraints on punishments that
resembled solitary confinement in their level of severity; a judicial history in
which courts sanctioned the practice even as they struck down other harsh
and harmful prison conditions, and a social and political history of its rapid
spread during the tough on crime era. First, Professor John Stinneford offers
an originalist critique of administrative discretion over prolonged isolation
in Is Solitary Confinement a Punishment?11 From English and American
legal history, including the U.S. Supreme Court decision In re Medley,12
Professor Stinneford derives the rule that a prison condition amounts to a
punishment if it: (1) was “historically used as a heightened form of
punishment” or (2) “inflict[s] substantial suffering beyond what is normally
imposed by a prison sentence.”13 He contends that solitary confinement is
9
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sufficiently harmful to meet the second prong of this disjunctive test and thus
to qualify as punishment. This conclusion strikes at the premise that a prison
sentence alone authorizes a prison official to impose solitary confinement as
a matter of administrative discretion. On the contrary, solitary confinement
is an additional punishment superadded to the fact of incarceration. A
panoply of constitutional protections that restrict the government’s power to
punish therefore apply to solitary confinement.
In Punishment in Prison: Constituting the “Normal” and the
“Atypical” in Solitary and Other Forms of Confinement,14 Professor Judith
Resnik and her coauthors explore the stakes—for the incarcerated, for courts,
and for the body politic—of judicial engagement with in-prison
punishments. They show that over the span of sixty years, the federal
judiciary came to reject filth, squalor, violence, and racial discrimination as
unconstitutional prison conditions, even though these features of
incarceration were commonplace. But the courts also accepted other harsh
deprivations, solitary confinement among them, as “normal” in the prison
environment, and consequently insulated them from judicial review.
Through data collected from more than 9,000 lower court decisions,
Professor Resnik and her coauthors show that while solitary confinement
may be “normal” in U.S. prisons, courts and prison administrators alike have
a key role to play in curtailing the practice.
In Mass Solitary and Mass Incarceration: Explaining the Dramatic
Rise in Prolonged Solitary in America’s Prisons,15 Professor Jules Lobel
considers a common explanation for the rise of isolation in the 1980s and
1990s: in the main, increasing prison violence drove the expansion of solitary
confinement. Contrary to this thesis, Professor Lobel contends that solitary
confinement flourished in large measure because it offered a tool of social
control as prison officials confronted growing ranks of “rebellious
prisoners—often, but not exclusively, African-American—who had
organized protests and disobedient conduct in American prisons from the
1960s to the 1980s.”16 As American corrections barreled toward mass
isolation, alternatives for high-security incarceration without extreme
isolation piled up on the wayside. But these models have new relevance
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today as corrections reformers take steps to curtail prolonged solitary
confinement.
Professors Stinneford, Resnik, and Lobel each combine, in different
ways, their historical analysis with the premise that prolonged inmate
isolation can be not only unpleasant and undesirable, but harmful, indeed
ruinous. In The Science of Solitary: Expanding the Harmfulness Narrative,17
Professor Craig Haney defends that premise against a small number of
dissenters who dismiss the effects as unproven, repeat the mantra “more
research is needed,” or consider the harm minimal or fleeting. The evidence
specific to solitary confinement is compelling and conclusive in itself,
Professor Haney argues, but it also represents only a subset of a much larger
scientific literature that proves the adverse consequences of analogous
experiences: “[W]hat we know about the negative psychological effects of
prison isolation is situated in a much larger scientific literature about the
harmfulness of social isolation, loneliness, and social exclusion in society
more generally.”18 Moreover, the damage inflicted by solitary confinement
is severe and persistent, with some of the dire harms manifesting most clearly
and strongly after release from isolation. These harms can include permanent
incapacitation of the ability to form human connections.
The final three Essays discuss advocacy strategies for curtailing solitary
confinement. First, in A Wrong Without a Right? Overcoming the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement in Solitary
Confinement Cases,19 Maggie Filler and Daniel Greenfield examine a
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that often poses an
obstacle to solitary confinement litigation: the “physical injury” requirement
applicable to claims for monetary damages. This rule, purportedly conceived
to weed out frivolous lawsuits while allowing meritorious claims to proceed
to court, frequently slams the courthouse door on litigants seeking redress
for barbaric conditions of confinement. Filler and Greenfield put forward an
interpretation of the PLRA’s physical injury requirement that aligns both
with Congress’s intent to squelch litigation over trivial injuries and with the
scientific consensus on the physiological toll of isolation. By offering
strategies for proving physical injury caused by solitary confinement and
challenging the mental injury versus physical injury dichotomy, Filler and
17
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Greenfield provide a framework for litigating meritorious damages claims
for unconstitutional and abusive solitary confinement.
Professor Margo Schlanger turns to a debate over models for change in
Incrementalist vs. Maximalist Reform: Solitary Confinement Case Studies.20
Maximalists warn that an incrementalist approach to eliminating solitary
confinement for particular populations normalizes its use for certain
prisoners, namely those who are less vulnerable. On the other hand,
incrementalists argue that gradual reform is more effective in reducing the
number of prisoners in solitary confinement: Only when the number of
prisoners in solitary has decreased can officials focus on abolishing the
practice. Professor Schlanger grounds this debate in case studies of solitary
reform in Massachusetts, where incrementalist reform has proven successful,
and in Indiana, where it has been less so. Ultimately, she concludes that
incrementalist reform is likely the most promising path toward solitary
confinement abolition. Not only do incremental reforms grow “reform
capacity and credibility,” but the alleged need for prisoner isolation “is
undermined by every day that passes without incident for a person who was
previously said to need solitary confinement.”21
In How Do We Reach a National Tipping Point in the Campaign to Stop
Solitary?,22 Amy Fettig analyzes why this moment is ripe for solitary reform.
Examining several harrowing cases of solitary confinement’s consequences,
including those of her own clients, she lays out the human rights crisis this
practice has wrought. However, hope for reform remains. Fettig attributes
this prospect to the strategic, sustained advocacy of solitary survivors and
civil rights lawyers. The movement to stop solitary has also grown through
international human rights standards, governmental allies, and an emerging
public awareness fostered by media coverage. Yet, to truly realize solitary
reform, Fettig contends that we need further public mobilization, research
into alternative practices, and greater prison oversight. Only then will we
reach the national tipping point we have been inching toward for the past ten
years.
This issue concludes with a Consensus Statement born of another
interdisciplinary conference, the Santa Cruz Summit in May 2018.23 This
Summit brought together international experts on solitary confinement to
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review and discuss current knowledge on the broad effects of the practice
and its current scientific, correctional, and human rights status. Summit
participants also discussed the ethical principles that should govern its use
and identified the most important directions for reform. The Summit resulted
in a set of guiding principles to advance solitary confinement reform both in
the United States and internationally. As many Summit participants were
also Symposium speakers, we conclude our issue with the Consensus
Statement to reflect our hope that this issue may serve as a handbook for
legal community members engaged in solitary confinement reform efforts.
We view the Statement as an embodiment of Senator Durbin’s sentiment:
“[W]ith persistence and hard work, [we] can move forward” on solitary
confinement reform.24
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